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Introduction: 
 
Our notion of the specific functions of the state and how these are performed 
have blurred during our lifetime. What were recently regarded as citizen's 
rights under the welfare state to education, health and other services may now 
be conceptualised in different ways. Both north and south states have 
engaged in contracting out many of their functions to private enterprise and 
the third sector. States have also shifted government functions from the 
traditional bureaucracy into the market through privatisation and 
corporatisation in areas such as telecommunications, banking, energy and 
correctional services. New quasi-government agencies abound, situated 
between the state, private enterprise and the third sector. Such flux is not only 
an attribute of our times. 
 
Under the reign of Queen Elizabeth 1 the Tudor state was also marked by 
significant changes. The introduction of the Poor Laws using a combination of 
criminal law to discourage vagrancy and parishes as a unit of government 
providing relief to the poor from their taxes was a significant transition. The 
Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth which identifies non-state charitable 
activities illustrates these contentions.  While in the main the Preamble 
focuses on examples of the direct relief of poverty such as the relief of the 
impotent, poor, sick, decayed and prisoners, capital infrastructure provision is 
also specifically mentioned. The preamble also specifies as charitable 
purposes "repaire of bridges, portes, havens, Causewaies, churches, 
seabanks and highways." This infrastructure was maintained by a mix of 
private agreements, the parish and other authorities in Tudor times. 
 
Moore in his Readings noted that: 
 
"a gift to repair seabanks is good, notwithstanding others stand bound, by 
covenant and prescription, to repair them,"  
 
as it permitted funds to be freed up to relieve poverty.2 Gareth Jones makes 
the argument based on Moore's Readings that the policy objective of the 
Tudors was to provide a system of poor relief through the Parishes and repair 
of such facilities by others permitted Parish funds to be freed up to relieve 
poverty.3 He notes this is why repair of Churches (a common law duty 
imposed on the Parish) in Moore's view was charitable, but not other religious 
purposes such as uses to find a chaplain to celebrate communion, repair 
private pews, or supply copies of prayer books which were not Parish 
responsibilities. Thus the clarifying test was, would support of the activity free 
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resources for the relief of poverty? It was not about who had the responsibility 
of providing public infrastructure or who controlled the infrastructure. In this 
light, the Preamble and its early interpretation is a pragmatic policy response 
to financing state activities. 
 
Since that time the role of the state has changed significantly, particularly in 
periods of war and, then with the rise of the welfare state. For example Gray 
wrote in his history of English philanthropy that,  
 
" With regard to many of those wants which were then relegated to the 
provision of charity, the state has since then, and at different times, 
recognised first one and then another as too common in their incidence and 
possessed of too general a social significance to be safely left in private 
hands. It has accordingly assumed the charge of them. The repair of bridges, 
ports, havens, causeways and highways had all along been in theory a public 
charge, whether as part of ancient trinodas necessitas or under the 
commissions of sewers and other Acts."4 
 
Ausatralian legal author Maxwell Bradshaw as recently as 1983 noted about 
Preamble's public facilities limb that,  
 
"Despite the fact that these works are now regarded as undertakings of either 
central or local government, they are still capable in appropriate cases of 
being objects of charity."5  
 
Just a couple of decades later, private and third sector enterprise are building, 
owning and operating facilities for the public, which were previously regarded 
as the nearly sole province of the state such as public freeways, prisons, 
power and water supply infrastructure. An Australian example is that much of 
the free public hospital system operated for many decades by some State 
governments has now been privatised, but required to "all intents and 
purposes provide publicly funded health services to public hospital patients 
consistent with Public Hospitals generally."6 Private and third sector firms are 
in essence delivering clearly state services as if they were the State.  
 
An added complication is that some of this transfer has been accompanied by 
a varied range of hybrid legal structures which are new to the legal system 
ranging from quasi-governmental agencies to orthodox commercial 
companies with government shareholdings. It is understandable that the 
public has difficulty in recognising the differences between these 
organisations and that problems may arise from this confusion. An extreme 
example is the infamous case of the National Safety Council Victoria Division 
where the chief executive officer was able through fraud to borrow three 
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hundred million dollars from banks.7 The nonprofit company’s board 
comprised many appointed representatives of government departments and 
was permitted to omit the cautionary word "limited" from its name. The major 
lending bank's officer wrote in a memorandum that the: 
 
"NSCA's status (non-profit-making and tax exempt) and its role as a 
provider of community service in the fields of health, safety and 
emergency services render it for practical purposes a quasi 
government body. It has developed and grown to such an extent that it 
has in my view become indispensable."8 
 
The court found that the organisation had been mistaken as a government 
guaranteed instrumentality, rather than a company with no issued capital and 
limited liability.9  
 
Given that like the Tudors, we are in the midst of a rapidly changing roles of 
the State, for profit and third sectors, where should the boundary lines be 
drawn in relation to what should be charitable in respect of public 
infrastructure facilities? 
 
The paper first examines the development of the law of charities when faced 
with the issue of whether a purpose is charitable or essentially governmental. 
Two recent law reform proposals, a discussion paper by the Charity 
Commission of England and Wales and the Australian Inquiry into the 
definition of charity have made proposals about the dividing line between such 
purposes and these are examined. The paper then turns to examine a current 
dilemma in Queensland in relation to public hospitals’ fundraising activities as 
an example of the practical and legal issues involved in the 
government/charity definition boundary line.  
 
The Law 
 
There are few decided cases over four hundred years directly on the issue of where 
the dividing line is between a charitable purpose and a government purpose.  This is 
in sharp distinction to the large body of case law on the dividing line between a 
charitable purpose and a mere private purpose as embodied in the Compton test.10 
This is reflected by the treatment of such issues in contemporary charity texts. 
Picarda11 and Tudor12 indirectly deal with the issue through the case of Construction 
Industry Training Board v A-G13 in the context of control by the Court and in a 
discussion of the limits of the fourth head of charity. Bradshaw examines Australian 
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cases in the context of the fourth head of charity14 and Dal Pont notes in the context 
of the fourth head that, 
 
 "… there is case law to the effect that a gift to a government or governmental body 
or authority is not charitable unless it be construed as being directed to an 
exclusively charitable purpose."15 
 
One of the earliest Australian cases involving such issues was Diocesan Trustees of 
the Church of England in Western Australia v Solicitor-General 16 where a testator left 
part of his residuary estate to the trustees of hospitals, lunatic asylums and poor 
houses in the Colony. At the date of both the will and death of the testator there was 
only one lunatic asylum in the Colony which was a purely government institution. The 
asylum’s creating statute prevented the establishment of any other similar institution. 
The Colonies two poor houses were also established by government legislation. If 
the funds "should go to swell the Government revenue", the court noted that it would 
not regard the gift as charitable.17 However, they found that it was the intention of the 
testator to provide inmates with comforts in excess of those provided by the Colony. 
The court applied a scheme to appoint trustees to so provide for the inmates and 
thus the bequest was saved. 
 
In re Cain18 is a Victorian case which concerned a testator who in his will devised and 
bequeathed one fourth of his estate to a state government department, being the 
Children's Welfare Department. The gift was opposed on a number of grounds being 
that it was not to a certain beneficiary, was not charitable and that a department of a 
State government was not capable of receiving money pursuant to a will. The court 
considered the case of In re Smith; Public Trustee v Smith19 where a gift to the 
country would be charitable. However, in this instance, the gift was not to the State of 
Victoria - to benefit inhabitants of a locality, but to a particular government 
department which was not considered charitable. However, the court was prepared 
to find that, 
 
"If the Department is able and willing to undertake for the benefit of children under its 
care some activities over and above its normal duties and is prepared to apply the 
present gift to that end, then, if such a course is fairly within what the testator 
intended, the gift would be charitable."20 
 
A cy pres scheme was offered to the Department to this effect. The Court was 
required to consider this avenue because: 
 
"… if the present gift be construed as a gift for carrying on the ordinary activities of a 
Government department pursuant to a statute, the gift is not a gift for charitable 
purposes, even if the activities are such that if carried on by private persons they 
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at 387. 
would be charitable. Such activities are simply part of the government of the 
country."21 
 
Two English cases, subject to a deal of criticism, suggest that providing inmates of 
government institutions with comforts was not a charitable purpose. In re Cole 
considered that a gift for the general benefit and welfare of children for the time being 
in a local government home (rather than to the home itself) was not regarded as 
charitable,22 but a gift to establish a children's home to be operated by a local council 
was regarded as charitable.23 Lord Justice Romer noted: 
 
"… I cannot regard the provision of television sets , etc., for the benefit of such 
persons as juvenile delinquents and refractory children in Southdown House as 
coming within any conception of charity which is found in the Preamble. If it were, 
then I suppose a gift to provide the inmates of a Borstal institution with amenities 
would be charitable, which would appear to me to be an impossible contention."24 
 
Both cases received adverse comment in The Law Quarterly Review25 and which 
claimed a preferable view was: 
 
“…the mere fact that some forms of “benefit” and “welfare” are enjoyable is not 
sufficient to exclude them from the concept of charity; no doubt a television set and a 
gramophone and records will give pleasure, but that alone does not prevent a trust 
for providing them from being charitable.”26  
 
Both cases appeared to accept that the local government could be the trustee of a 
charity trust for "the endowment or maintenance of such a home", despite the fact 
that the accommodation of such persons by council was mandated by a statute.27 
 
In re Cain was examined in a recent Victorian case involving the charitable status of 
a housing co-operative.28 A housing co-operative was formed after government 
investigations about the most appropriate way to provide an consumer controlled, but  
independent of government rental housing co-operative sector for low income 
earners. The government supplied almost two-thirds of the funds to purchase 1,500 
rental properties for the co-operative which then leased houses to smaller co-
operatives. The question before the court was whether the co-operative was exempt 
from stamp duty on the purchase of the properties because it was charitable.  
 
One of the arguments put forward was that a clause in the co-operative's constitution 
required any surplus assets upon dissolution to be distributed to the "Director of 
Public Rental Housing for the acquisition of public rental housing."29 It was argued 
using the authority of In re Cain that this was incompatible with the co-operative 
being charitable. The court believed that the nature of the dissolution clause should 
not be considered decisive in determining charitable status and could be 
distinguished from a bequest issue. An issue about a bequest was an immediate 
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problem, where as a dissolution clause could not be adequately considered until a 
dissolution occurred. The court appeared to endorse the principles set out in Cain's 
case.30 
 
The Commissioner of Taxation in his draft ruling31 on the instances where an 
organisation will be regarded as charitable refers to just two cases In re Cain and 
Auckland Harbor Board cases. Both cases where decided in the context of the role of 
the state in the 1950s where government functions were stable. The Auckland 
Harbour Board case involved a New Zealand statutory body set up to administer a 
harbour and was found not to be charitable.32 It also had activities that went far 
beyond the repair and maintenance of public facilities such as jurisdiction over the 
conduct of shipping in certain waters. The court found that the body had significant 
powers of regulation consistent with it being part of government and further that the 
body was not capable of being supervised by the court.33  
 
The draft ruling states that "Government departments and organisations are unlikely 
to be charitable institutions. They are simply performing a governmental 
responsibility."34 It gives no further direct assistance in drawing the line in more 
difficult cases where government has created separate bodies to perform what would 
otherwise be regarded as charitable activities, or where a gift goes to functions 
beyond government’s responsibility.   
 
The issue of the dividing line between government and other organisations has also 
arisen in Australia in relation to the taxation definitions of "public benevolent 
institution" and "public charity". Such organisations are always charitable, but are 
required to have additional attributes. In these instances, the courts have focused on 
the connection a body has with government measured by the government control  
over the body. The evidence of control considered by the courts include factors such 
as the power to control the affairs of others, impose penalties on the public, ministers 
being given power to control the organisation such as appointment of senior staff, 
approval of budgets, fees and charges.35  
 
The Australian Taxation Office has issued a Taxation Determination on the question 
“can a body which is formed by government, is controlled by government and 
performs functions on behalf of government be an ‘association’ for the purposes of 
section 65J of the Fringe Benefits Tax assessment Act 1986 (FBTAA)."36 The ruling 
determines that such a body cannot be an association because it does not act on 
behalf of its members, but for the purposes of government. 
 
In England, the most recent case of Construction Industry Training Board v Attorney-
General 37 involved a board that was created by a statutory instrument. The Minister 
had power to amend and revoke any order, members were appointed by the Minister 
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and liable to be removed if they refused to comply with the directions of the Minister. 
The body applied to be registered as a charity and the case turned on the issue of 
the requirement of the Charities Act 1960 (UK) that an charity "is subject to the 
control of the High Court in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction with respect to 
charities."38 Lord Justice Russell noted that if this qualification had not been present, 
"then there would be no problem; for it is common ground that the board fulfils the 
definition so far, and thus would be registrable as a 'charity.'"39 Lord Justice Buckley 
noted that it was conceded that the Board was established for charitable purposes40 
and further found that the Minister did not have control of the Board in the 
performance of its functions.41  
 
The new structures used by governments combined with what are the current 
responsibilities of government have posed some difficult issues for the courts in 
deciding through common law principles what should be regarded as charitable. It is 
not surprising that it has been an issue for law reform, to which the paper now turns. 
 
Reforms 
 
The Charity Commission for England and Wales has published its views about the 
extent to which charities are required to be independent of the State in the context of 
its review of the charity register.42 The review of currently registered charities is only 
made after the Commission conducts wide consultation on charitable status of 
particular activities. The focus of the opinion is upon the independence of charities 
from government, in that the body must be established for purposes that are 
exclusively charitable. The opinion gives the example of the attributes of an 
independent charity negotiating with a government authority for funding: 
 
"- the trustees would have a choice about whether or not they accepted funding 
on the terms proposed by the governmental authority; 
- they would take their own legal and financial advice; 
- they would conduct arms-length negotiations with the governmental authority; 
- a trustee who was subject to a conflict of interest would not participate in 
discussions; 
- the funding arrangements would preserve the trustees' fundamental 
discretions as to the selection of beneficiaries and the provision of services; 
- the trustees would not commit themselves simply to giving effect to the 
policies and wishes of the governmental authority; 
- the trustees would not agree to conditions that undermined the confidentiality 
of their discussions (such as the presence at their meetings of an observer 
from the governmental authority); and 
- the trustees would be free to make their own decisions on matters outside the 
scope of the funding arrangement."43 
 
The Commission makes it very clear that it is possible for government to create 
bodies to perform a function of government that also coincides with a charitable 
purpose. The motive of doing so, such as to take advantage of the fiscal and other 
benefits, is irrelevant to the body’s status. However, it must be independent of the 
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creating authority and this includes indirect means of control such as through funding 
conditions or policy control. The rationale for such a view is not disclosed other than 
the common law requires charities to be independent.  
 
The Australian Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related 
Organisations devoted a chapter to discussing the issue of government bodies and 
charities.44 The Report recommended that the current exclusion of government 
bodies from charity is appropriate, but noted that further clarification of the rationale 
for not accepting government bodies as charities is required. 
 
The Report noted that many submissions commented that the dividing line between 
charities and government was blurring. In submission received, health care charities 
in particularly found that it was not immediately obvious whether an entity was part of 
government or not. Some State governments argued that their activities (where 
otherwise charitable) should be given concessional taxation treatment. The Report 
concluded in the following terms, 
 
"The Committee therefore supports the current approach of relying on the 
level of government control as the indicator of whether or not the purpose of 
an entity is to carry out the responsibilities of government. The Committee 
acknowledges that there will always be some uncertainty about the factors 
that will determine what degree of control will establish whether an entity is a 
government body. These uncertainties can only be resolved on the basis of 
facts, on a case-by-case basis.  
 
When considering whether a body is government controlled, other than where 
an entity is expressly designated as government, there is no single feature 
that is determinative. Any test based on a single factor would be arbitrary. 
However, the factors that will be important include the extent to which the 
government, represented by the relevant Minister, has the authority to control 
the operations of the entity. It is not germane whether or not that authority is 
exercised, but whether it exists. For example, the persuasive factors for 
determining that the entity in the Fire Brigades case was government 
controlled included the powers of the relevant Minister, and the ability of the 
entity to make by-laws and to impose penalties for breaches of the by-laws it 
made.  
 
The Committee agrees with the approach taken in the Mines Rescue Board 
case and the Fire Brigades case. The principles in these cases, as discussed 
in relation to the facts in those matters, provide the most authoritative judicial 
guidance as to the factors to be considered when deciding whether an entity 
is a government body. As indicated by the judges in the Fire Brigades case, 
key amongst the pertinent factors is whether the body is constituted, funded 
and controlled by government."45 
 
It is interesting to contrast this with the approach of the Charity Commission guidance 
which places emphasis on ”independence” rather than “control”. This approach may 
assist in an understanding of the distinction between the body being accountable to 
government through a system or framework of regulation and being controlled by the 
government.  
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Governments appear conscious of bearing the brunt of public dissatisfaction about 
recently outsourced services without having their previous powers to rectify the 
situation. It is particularly sensitive when the inadequate delivery of formerly citizen’s 
rights by independent entities is involved. The communication to a dissatisfied public 
that it is not the government’s fault because it is now the responsibility of an 
independent body and beyond its immediate control is a difficult task. The tendency 
of governments to design structures which appear to give independence, but have 
reserve command and control powers is understandable in these circumstances. 
 
The Hospitals Foundations Act 1982 
 
Australia has a long traditional of public fundraising support for its health care 
institutions, often through voluntary auxiliaries. An early Queensland example 
is the 1849 Committee of the Moreton Bay General Hospital (later the Royal 
Brisbane Hospital) which launched the first of many appeals to the community 
for assistance. In order to secure an annual grant of 200 pounds from the 
government for the running of the hospital, the committee had to raise an 
equal sum from the community. In 1858, the hospital committee decided to 
hold a "Public Subscription Ball and Bazaar" with an admission charge of 20 
shillings for gentlemen and 10 shillings for ladies, to raise funds to match and 
secure a government grant of 800 pounds for repairs and additions to the 
hospital.  
 
The tradition of community fundraising for the Royal Children’s Hospital 
Foundation in Brisbane began in August 1877, when Mrs Mary McConnel 
began her appeal to build a children’s hospital by selling produce at the 
Annual Brisbane Exhibition.  The hospital committee system, which she 
helped to develop, continued to be a major source of funds for the running of 
the hospitals for almost 50 years. 
 
In 1920, the Brisbane hospitals began to receive funds from the Government 
operated Golden Casket lottery to help to defray the ever-increasing costs of 
providing free hospital services.  This tradition continues today. Despite the 
fact that Queensland hospitals were “taken over” by the Queensland 
government in 1923, the public has continued to support Queensland 
hospitals with bequests, donations and by conducting fundraising events in 
aid of the Hospitals.  
 
There are currently twelve foundations to support public hospitals. The principal 
function of all hospital foundations is to raise funds from the public to support 
their hospitals or medical research. In 1999-2000 hospital foundations had 
total revenues of $17.54 million and distributed to their hospitals and 
associated research communities a total of $14.34 million. The largest source 
of income is donations and bequests (37.32%), followed by special purpose 
grants for the provision of specific services (27.82%). Several hospital 
foundations have successful related commercial operations including 
management rights to hospital car parks, hospital canteens and flower shops 
and this represents a growing source of revenue at 14.31% of the total 
revenues. The competitive advantage that the foundations have in using 
volunteers, makes the use of the hospital foundation, rather than employees 
of the hospital an attractive option for hospital administrators. The foundations 
direct their resources to funding equipment, research, medical education, 
patient amenities and new facilities connected with their hospital. In legal 
terms, the majority of funded items could be classified as items outside core 
necessities of a public hospital. The taxation and other concessions available 
to charitable entities make the classification of the foundations as charitable, 
desirable to the foundations. 
 
An interesting question to pose at this point is, “Is the collection of gifts and 
generation of income from commercial enterprises to fund a public 
government controlled hospital a charitable purpose?” One response may be 
that funding such provisions is a core activity of government. Another would 
be that the particular history of the hospitals involved has shown a pattern of 
public donation to hospital funding which is not a function of government. 
Alternatively, if one accepts that hospital funding once was a core government 
activity, perhaps it no longer is, as suggested in court in the recent Mines 
Rescue Board case, 
 
“The notion that certain activities are the responsibility of government is not 
one which could comfortably be made by a court today except in very limited 
circumstances.”46 
 
and 
 
“So it may be said today that “privatisation” of the responsibilities of 
government is wide spread. This is so in relation to matters such as the 
provision of public hospitals and health services which for many years in 
Australia have been regarded as the responsibility of government.”47 
 
Foundations established to support hospitals in states other than Queensland   are 
incorporated associations, companies limited by guarantee or charitable trusts and in 
general have had little trouble satisfying the criteria as charitable organisations. 
Some of the hospital foundations in Queensland have experienced difficulty in 
establishing their taxation status largely because of the nature of their establishing 
legislation and relationship with the state.48 Queensland is the only State in Australia 
to have a special legislative provision which facilitates the creation of a hospital 
foundation for public hospitals. The Hospital Foundations Act 1982 provides for the 
establishment of corporate bodies to hold property to aid health services and related 
objects.  
 
The formal reason given by the Queensland Minister for Health in the Second 
Reading speech to the Bill establishing the legislation was that: 
 
“The desire to establish hospital foundations was initially noted when the North 
Brisbane Hospitals Board applied to my department for the establishment of such a 
body to allow for the investment of substantial unspecified trust funds accrued over 
many years for the purpose of earning an income, and for this income to be applied 
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at para 26. 
47 Id. 
48 Royal Children’s Hospital Foundation, Joint Submission to the Inquiry into the Definition of 
Charities and Related Organisations, Brisbane, December, 2000. 
to the purchase of books, visual aids, etc; provision of fellowships and travel grants 
for staff; improved educational facilities; research, and invitations to or employment of 
renowned lecturers in the health care field and for other specified purposes.”49 
 
and, 
 
“The proposed Act will enable private individuals, companies, other groups of 
interested persons or hospital boards themselves to make application for the 
establishment of a body corporate that is associated with a hospital provided, in the 
first instance, that they can comply with the requirements, in the proposed Act, of an 
applicant in regard to property to be applied."50 
It appears that a mechanism was required to properly administer growing 
bequests, donations and their application.51  
 
The foundations are established as a statutory body corporate by the authority 
of the Governor in Council52 on the advice of the Health Minister who has 
approved an application for such a foundation from a member of the public.53  
Each body may registered its own objects which require the approval of the 
Minister (as does their alteration), but the Act provides a list of possible 
objects for a body in section 13. The eleven objects in themselves are 
charitable in nature being concerned with support of hospitals and health 
services, conduct and support of medical research and education and 
incidental objects. It can be argued that the Ministerial approvals are not in 
themselves evidence of the foundations being part of government rather than 
an independent charitable body. For example, Queensland incorporated 
associations are subject to approval from the chief executive of the relevant 
department before incorporation or change of rules are granted. 54 These 
parts of the legislation can be characterised as merely setting out a framework 
of regulation. In the absence of a “departmental registry” common in other 
incorporation schemes, it is appropriate for such responsibilities to reside with 
the Minister. 
 
The foundation is able to conduct its business as it sees fit.55 While the Act 
gives such bodies general power to do all lawful things necessary to carry out 
its objects,56 it also list twenty-four specific powers.57 Seven of these powers 
can only be exercised with the approval of the Minister and include 
investments, the purchase, sale and development of real property, some 
arrangements with other parties and invention rewards. The issue is whether 
these show control by the government, indicating that it is a function of 
government or from the perspective of the Charity Commission mitigates 
against independence. It is a difficult issue, but it clearly does not go as far as 
                                            
49 Minister for Health, Queensland Legislative Assembly Hansard, 11 March 1982, p 4697 
50 Id. 
51 Internal Memorandum, Manager Royal Children’s Hospital Board, 21 February, 1986. 
52 s 7 Hospitals Foundation Act 1982 (HFA). 
53 s 5&6 HFA. 
54 S 48 Incorporated Associations Act 1985. 
55 s 31 HFA 
56 S 14 HFA 
57 s 15 HFA 
other Australian cases where ministers had the power to give direct written 
instructions to the Boards.58 
 
The members of the body corporate are appointed by the Governor on the 
advice of the Minister who is required for part of the membership to seek 
panels of candidates from local health bodies.59 The secretary to the 
foundation is approved by the Minister.60 The Governor on the advice of the 
Minister can also: 
 
• fill casual vacancies; 61 
• remove a member;62 
• appoint the chair;63 and 
• can seek budgets and accounting records.64 
 
This method of appointment whilst controlled by the Minister does result in a 
majority of community representatives on the foundation boards. Again, these 
provisions could be characterised as a framework of regulation rather than 
overt control. 
 
The reporting requirements of the foundations can also be characterised as purely 
regulatory in nature. Section 51 of the Act specifically states that a foundation is a 
statutory body under the Statutory Bodies Financial Arrangements Act 1982. The 
Queensland Audit Office audits hospital foundations incorporated under the Hospital 
Foundations Act. On winding up of a foundation surplus property is to be transferred 
to a body as in the opinion of the Governor has similar objects.65 On the authority of 
Common Equity Housing Ltd 66 this of itself is not enough to indicate that the 
organisation is not charitable. 
 
The foundations, unlike other cases discussed earlier do not regulate public 
behaviours,67 impose penalties on the public,68 collect levies or taxes69 or 
provide services to the public,70 which were factors in the overall classification 
of the bodies as instruments of the state. The foundations sole purpose is to 
raise funds and this tends to suggest that they are more in the character of 
charitable bodies, rather than core agents of government. 
 
However, two provisions in the Act do not provide much comfort that the 
drafters intended the foundations to be charitable bodies at common law. The 
                                            
58 Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board v FC of T 91 ATC 4052 and Mines Rescue Board of New 
South Wales v Commissioner of Taxation [2000} FCA 1162. 
59 s 18 HFA 
60 s 37 HFA 
61 s 23 HFA 
62 s 24 & 27 HFA 
63 s 28 HFA 
64 s 46 HFA 
65 s 60 HFA 
66 96 ATC 4,596. 
67 Auckland Harbour Board v IRC [1959] NZLR 204. 
68 Auckland Harbour Board v IRC [1959] NZLR 204; Mines Rescue Board of New South 
Wales v Commissioner of Taxation [2000} FCA 1162. 
69 Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board v FC of T 91 ATC 4052 
70 Common Equity Housing Ltd v Commr. of State Revenue (Vic) 96 ATC 4,596. 
Act in sections16 and 17 deems the Collections Act and the Property Law Act 
to apply to the foundations which would not be necessary if they were clearly 
regarded as charitable entities. This may be put down to an abundance of 
caution on the part of the drafter, but in such cases it is usual for the sections 
to be expressed as clarifications to avoid any ambiguity, rather than  
“deeming” the bodies to be subject to the particular provisions. 
 
The task of deciding whether such foundations are charitable is not an easy 
determination in their present situation. The matter is capable of clarification 
by minor statutory amendment to remove any doubt of government control 
and entrench the perception of independence in the management of such 
bodies or permitting them to adopt a more common legal form as is the case 
in other jurisdictions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the roles played by business, government and third sector alter and 
boundaries between them blur, implementing common law definitions of what 
is charitable will become increasingly difficult. The new breed of government 
created bodies that have been given charge of former state services and 
responsibilities will continue to challenge past classifications. This is 
particularly so where such arrangements involve reservation of governmental 
powers of control and command, but bodies are encouraged and expected to 
exercise independence from government. Until the state feels comfortable to 
relinquish such statutory based administrative powers and rely on the usual 
forms of power and influence in the market (such as contractual provisions 
and share ownership), then such issues will continue.  
 
There is a useful distinction to be made in such problematic cases between 
provisions that are merely part of the regulatory framework and those that 
indicate a control more consistent with governmental functions. While each 
situation will depend on a view of all the relevant circumstances, many 
provisions merely seek to establish accountabilities and mechanisms to 
facilitate the operations of the body. Appointment of members, requiring 
reports and accounts, approval of constitutional documents, provisions for 
winding–up and supervisions of the distribution of surplus assets are routine 
matters that without more should not be characterised as control merely 
because they involve state officials.  
 
The prospects of law reform to bring certainty to the definitional boundary 
between what is charitable with its attractive fiscal concessions and what is a 
function of the state could take several paths. If some type of regulatory body 
is established in Australia as mooted by the Report of the Inquiry into the 
Definition of Charities and Related Organisations, then more clarity as to a 
body’s charitable status may result. A statutory definition of charity might 
attempt to draw a distinction between such bodies, but as the case study 
illustrates, this may be a difficult ‘one size fits all’ task. The definition might 
also be extended to include such quasi-state agencies. Another approach 
may be to consider extending fiscal benefits for such bodies and leaving the 
definitional boundary where it is at present. 
 
 
 
 
